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Fighting Outside the Ring: A Labor Alternative to
the Continued Federal Regulation of Professional
Boxing
ARLIN R. CRISCO*
Inside the ring, boxers fight for their lives. Their safety is at risk Outside the ring,
boxers are financially vulnerable. They must associate with the right managers and
promoters in order to realize a big payday. Currently, there is little federal regulation of
the sport of boxing and little uniformity among state regulations. This inadequate
regulation scheme puts boxers' safety andfinancialfuture in jeopardy. This Note proposes
that boxers organize under the NLRA to achieve appropriate regulation of the sport. This
Note examines the current lack of effective regulation and discusses organization under
the NLRA as a means ofprotecting boxers'physical andfinancial well being.
I. NTRODUCTION
On New Year's Day 1995, Gerald McClellan was a world champion
professional boxer who regularly fought for six-figure purses and was looking
forward to a title bout that could net him over a million dollars. 2 By New Year's
1996, McClellan was a deaf and blind3 multiple-stroke victim 4 who relied day-to-
day on trust fund donations because his own assets had been exhausted.
5
* I would like to thank Yuld Kendall, for her love and emotional support over the
years, as well as her unswerving faith and understanding while I struggled with this Note. I
would also like to thank my mother, Elsie M. Crisco, whose love and guidance helped me
get to where I am today; and my brother, Steve Hardy, for his friendship and advice, and
for helping me over many a rocky path through the years. Thanks also to my "big brother"
Scott Gurvis for his years of friendship, his loyalty, and for being a role model to me. This
Note is dedicated to the memory of my father, Harold E. Crisco.
This Note received the Rebecca Topper Memorial Award for the outstanding written
contribution by a third-year member of the Ohio State Law Journal.
I See Richard Hoffer, Enough?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 6, 1995, at 24,26 (discussing
how, at the time, McClellan was the World Boxing Council (WBC) middleweight champion).
2 McClellan was "angling for a huge money bout' on pay-per-view television with
International Boxing Federation super-middleweight champion Roy Jones, Jr. See Richard
Hoffer, Dark Days, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 4, 1996, at 82, 90 ("All he had to do to attain
financial security was stay on track, and only for a little while. Another quick and brutal fight
and he would have been a pay-per-view force in boxing.").
3 See id. at 84 (describing McClellan's coming to grips with his blindness, while being
cared for by his family, "Now why, when he thinks about it, would it be dark 24 hours-three
sisters' worh-a day? It's odd.").
4 See id at 85 ("In London, where he had emergency brain surgery immediately after the
bout and spent two months in a coma, McClellan had two strokes and, supposedly, a heart
attack.").
5 See id at 90 (describing the medical bills and legal battles over McClellan's
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The cause of the physical tragedy was the beating McClellan took at the
hands of World Boxing Council (WBC) super-middleweight champion Nigel
Benn on February 25, 1995.6 McClellan was knocked out in the tenth round of
the brutal fight7 and fell into unconsciousness after being led back to his comer.
He was then rushed to a hospital where he needed emergency surgery to save his
life.8
However, while the bout itself caused the physical tragedy, the financial
disaster that struck McClellan was due in part to the lack of a sport-wide pension
or disability insurance fund9 to help defray the costs of McClellan's medical bills.
While McClellan's sudden injury was unusual, if not unique,10 many fighters
retire with some chronic ailment as a result of the sport,'1 while others who have
guardianship that have exhausted his savings). Fighters such as Roy Jones, Jr. and Riddick
Bowe promised to contribute percentages of their fight income to the trust fund. However, as of
March 1996 the trust fund had "hardly any income... and the money dribbles away.
[McClellan's father] Emmit imagines his son's trust fund could be exhausted in six months,
maybe a year ...... Id.
6 See Hoffer, supra note 2, at 84.
7 See id. (describing how McClellan's "savage fight with Benn ... ended when McClellan
suddenly fell to his knees .... "); see also Jack McCallum, Scorecard: Bad Decisions, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 26, 1996, at 30, 33 (criticizing two prominent boxing magazines, KO and
Boxing Illustrated, for naming the McClellan-Benn bout 'Tight of the Year").
8 See Hoffer, supra note 1, at 27 (describing the neurological team at the boxing site and
the contingencies in place to rush severely injured boxers to an area trauma center).
9 See Kelley C. Howard, Regulating the Sport of Boxing-Congress Throws the First
Punch with the Professional Boxing Safety Act, 7 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 103, 103
(discussing the inadequacy of insurance coverage for fighters); Scorecard: A Crippling Need,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 3, 1995, at 14, 14 (stating that professional boxing is one of few
major sports without an industry-wide pension fund).
10 Other fighters, such as Rae Duk Koo Kim and Jimmy Garcia, have suffered massive
brain injuries during a single bout. See, e.g., Australian Boxer Dies After Fight, WASH. POST,
May 1, 1996, at B02 (detailing the death of featherweight boxer Lance Hobson from brain
hemorrhage and describing the death of Duk Koo Kim); Richard Hoffer, Glory and Sorrow,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 15, 1995, at 48, 49 (detailing a fight between Gabriel Ruelas and
Jimmy Garcia that left Garcia in a coma).
11 See Kevin M. Walsh, Boxing: Regulating a Health Hazard, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POL'Y 63, 67 (1994) (discussing the fact that boxing has the highest morbidity rates and
potential for neurological damage of any of the major sports). The theory of chronic brain
trauma in veteran professional fighters is well-known as "punch drumkenness" but is more
accurately Parkinson's Syndrome--a neurological disorder that causes tremor, muscle rigidity,
and slowed movement. While Parkinson's Syndrome is a symptom of Parkinson's Disease, it
can also develop through repeated blows to the head. Muhammad Ali is perhaps the most
famous example of a Parkinson's Syndrome victim. See THOMAS HAUSER, MUHAMMAD ALI:
HIS LIFE AND TIMEs 488-94 (1991) (quoting Columbia University neurologist Stanley Fahn in
detailing the causes and symptoms of Ali's Parkinson's Syndrome). In a study of 30
professional fighters conducted by neurologist Barry Jordan of the UCLA medical center, 63%
had neurological abnormalities and 10% of those boxers showed signs of severe neurological
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made millions during their careers retire penniless, due to financial abuse at the
hands of their managers and promoters.12 Conversely, the vast majority of
boxers-the 'Journeymen" who fight for small purses in local bingo halls and
small-town convention centers-do not earn enough money to allow them to save
for their lives after the sport.1 3 Without a pension plan, these fighters often retire
from boxing with no financial security.
During his 14 career, the fighter often finds himself with no assistance in
damage. See Barry Jordan et al., Jorda Apolipoprotein E 4 Associated with Chronic Traumatic
Brain Injury, 278 J. AM. MEDICAL ASSOC. 136, 138 (1997); see also FERDIE PACHEC,
MUHAMMAD ALI: A VIEW FROM THE CORNER 199-205 (detailing the effects of Parkinson's
Syndrome in fighters and the increased risk of physical injury to a Parkinson's-affected boxer
who continues to fight); Beverly Merz, Is Boxing a Risk Factor for Alzheimer's?, 261 J. AM.
MEDICAL ASsoc. 2597, 2597-98 (1989) (discussing the possibility that boxers may be at a
higher risk for Alzheimer's disease); see generally Ross Rosen, In the Aftermath of McClellan:
Isn't It Time for the Sport of Boxing to Protect It's Participants?, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L.
611 (1995) (discussing the likelihood of boxing injuries and examining studies on safety
measure implementation to reduce the risk of both acute and chronic boxing injuries).
12 See, e.g., Hearings on Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, S.2238 Before the Senate
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, 105th Cong. (1998), available in
WESTLAW, U.S. Testimony [hereinafter Hearings on Boxing Rules Revision] (statement of
Mike Tyson) ("The opportunity for abuse [in boxing] is gigantic.... [A]s the absence of
meaningful regulations in this industry has allowed others to run in an open field with my
finances .... I am currently coming to fully understand how over $65 million was taken from
me in less than 24 months."); THE RING: BOXING IN THE 20TH CENTURY 75 (Steven Farhood,
ed.) (1993) (discussing Joe Louis, former heavyweight champion from 1937 to 1949, who
"owed the Internal Revenue Service $1.2 million shortly after his retirement. At the time his
annual income was $20,000.'); Ronald Grover, The P.T Barnum of Fist City, Bus. WEEK,
Nov. 18, 1996, at 96, 100 (discussing alleged misappropriations of millions of dollars by
promoter Don King from former boxing champions Muhammad Ali and Tim Witherspoon).
13 See 138 CONG. REC. S5658, S5662 (daily ed., Apr. 28, 1992) (report presented by Sen.
Roth) ("[F]or every boxer who steps into the spotlight in Atlantic City or Las Vegas for a
multimillion dollar title fight, there exists a multitude of fighters scrounging to make a living on
the club fight circuit oftentimes sacrificing their well-being in the process."); Randall Lane,
Pugilism's Lopsided Economics: Why Does George Foreman Get $10 Million for One Fight
While Another Ex-Champ Gets $250for Eight Bloody Rounds?, FORBES, Dec. 18, 1995, at 202,
204 ("The five fighters on this year's Forbes Super 40... superstars all, collectively earned
over $100 million. The world's other 5,000 pro fighters ... earned ... on average under
$20,000 (usually far under), not a lot of money for the risk of having your brains knocked out.")
(parenthetical in original).
14 The sport of female boxing is in its inception. See, e.g., Nancy Foley, Bad Intentions,
WOMEN'S SPORTS & FITNESS, Apr. 1998, at 32, 33; Evelyn Nieves, A Boxer in a Hurry, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Nov. 3, 1996, § 6 at 38; William Plummer & Meg Grant, Woman Warrior: Boxer
Christy Martn Crushes Opponents and Stereotypes, PEOPLE, June 24, 1996, at 101, 101. Many
of the arguments in this Note could pertain to female as well as to male boxers. However,
because of the lack of anecdotal information regarding female professional fighters, this Note
will make its argument only regarding male boxers. Thus, masculine pronouns are used.
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selecting and negotiating contractual terms with a manager,15 or in dealing with
promoters 16 and private agencies that sanction professional bouts.17 Additionally,
the laws designed to protect a fighter-from unscrupulous managers and
promoters as well as from dangerous fight conditions-vary widely across the
country.' 8 Each state has its own safety guidelines; licensing qualifications for
boxers, promoters, and managers; contest judge and referee selection criteria;
minimum fighter purses; et cetera. 19 Thus, a fighter faces a greater chance of
severe injury in one state than in another due to differences in safety standards;
and a promoter facing allegations of fight fixing in one state may become licensed
to arrange fights elsewhere.20
This broad range of rules and the abuse it has allowed have brought about
repeated calls for strict federal regulation of the sport.2 ' However, after numerous
hearings and proposed legislation over the past eight years, Congress has
provided only the bare minimum in safety standards. 22 The main reason for this
failure to fully regulate boxing at the federal level has been a combination of
strong resistance from those in charge of the sport, combined with congressional
15 See infra notes 31-38 and accompanying text. The manager is the fighter's primary
connection regarding the sport's business relationship and wields a great deal of financial
control over the fighter, often acting as the boxer's agent, chief financial advisor, and sponsor.16 See infra notes 41-62 Once signed to a contract, the promoter wields significant
control over a professional boxer's career.
17 There are at least three major international sanctioning bodies (the World Boxing
Council (WBC), the International Boxing Federation (IBF), and the World Boxing Association
(WBA)), as well as numerous minor sanctioning agencies that set their own contest rules (in
accordance with applicable state law), rank member fighters, and name champions. For a
detailed discussion of the role of the sanctioning agencies, see infra notes 68-79 and
accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 80-96 and accompanying text; see also e.g., Hearings on Boxing Rules
Revision, supra note 12 (statement of Larry Hazzard) (discussing the multitiered boxing safety
and licensing regulations in New Jersey); Hearings on Professional Boxing Before the House
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Hazardous Material, 103d Cong. (1996), available in
WESTLAW, U.S. Testimony (statement of Rep. John Dingell) (discussing the inconsistency
between states regarding regulations).
19 See infra notes 80-96 (discussing the inconsistency among the various states regarding
regulatory subjects dealing with boxing).
20 See Gerard Shields, Boxer Recants Dive Tale, ORLANDO SENmNEL, Sept. 23, 1994, at
DI (discussing allegations that an Orlando promoter coerced one of his boxers to lose a fight
intentionally, then moved out of state to promote fights while still under investigation in
Florida).
21 See infra notes 99-140 and accompanying text for a detailed history of attempts at
federal intervention.
22 See The Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996, 15 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. III 1997)
(establishing certain minimum nationwide safety and regulatory standards in professional
boxing). For more information about the Professional Boxing Safety Act, see infra notes 140-
60 and accompanying text.
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reluctance to intervene extensively within the industry 2 3
Other major sports have had similar problems. For example, professional
baseball players were without pension plans until after World War II.24 Yet, the
advent of the Major League Baseball Players' Association brought more equal
bargaining power to players and allowed them to negotiate for greater rights
within the industry.25 Because of the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB)
decision in American League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. NLRB,26 almost
all team sports are now able to unionize under the National Labor Relations Act(NLRA).27
However, in order to establish a union protected under the NLRA,
professional boxers must be classified as employees under the statute.28 While the
NLRB has not yet determined the statutory employment status of professional
boxers, a proper application of relevant agency principles29 suggests that boxers
meet the NLRA's employment requirement
Part II of this Note will discuss the role of each of the administrative groups
in professional boxing, the lack of a uniform governing body in the sport, and
how these two factors combine to lead to exploitation of professional fighters.
Part I will detail attempts at controversial federal regulation of the sport, leading
23 See infra notes 129-38 and accompanying text (discussing the opposition to federal
boxing regulation from both boxing insiders and federal legislators).
24 See, e.g., JAMES EDWARD MILLER, THE BASEBALL BUSINESS: PURSUING PENNANTS
AND PROFITS IN BALTIMORE, 13 (1990) (stating the first pension fund was developed for major
league baseball players in 1949); MARVIN MILLER, A WHOLE DIFFERENT BALL GAME: THE
SPORT AND BUSINESS OF BASEBALL 39-58 (1991) (discussing baseball labor relations prior to
unionization); Anthony Sica, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: Out of the Pennant Race Since
1972, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J 295, 298-304 (discussing the history of
employment relations in the major professional sports).
2 5 See generally JOHN HELYAR, LORDS OF THE REALM: THE REAL HISTORY OF BASEBALL
(1994); JAMES EDWARD MILLER, supra note 24 (discussing the growth of unions and the
subsequent power they brought professional athletes in bargaining with team owners); JON
MORGAN, GLORY FOR SALE: FANS, DOLLARS, AND THENEW NFL (1997).
26 180 N.L.R.B. 190 (1969) (concluding that professional baseball was an industry
affecting commerce and thus the sport was within its jurisdiction).
2 7 See Michael S. Hobel, Application of the Labor Exemption After the Expiration of
Collective Bargaining Agreements in Professional Sports, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 164, 169 n.l
(stating that since the NLRB's decision in American League of Professional Baseball Clubs v.
NLRB, "[flt has been clear that professional team sports are subject to the full coverage" of the
NLRA).
2 8 See infra notes 177-84 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for a
workers' group to unionize under the NLRA).
2 9 Both the NLRB and reviewing courts use agency principles in determining whether
workers wishing to unionize are considered employees for purposes of the NLRA. For further
discussion of this topic, see infra notes 186-223 and accompanying text
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to the passage of the Professional Boxing Act of 1996.30 It will then analyze how
the statute does little in the way of adequately protecting fighters. Part IV will
examine the requirements for unionizing under the NLRA, including the statute's
employment requirement. After detailing the proper test for determining
employee status, this Part will propose that a proper application of the test deems
professional boxers employees under the NLRA, and thus subject to its
protection. Finally, Part V will conclude that applying this standard will allow
professional boxers to assure uniform safety regulations within the sport and
financial security among the sport's participants without further federal
legislation.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP OF BOXING'S MAJOR PARTIES
In order to detail the potential benefits unionization would bring to
professional boxers, one must first understand the relationship between boxers
and the individuals responsible for managing the sport. Section A will describe
the duties of both boxing managers and promoters, as well as the often collusive
relationship between the two. Section B will detail the authority of the private
sanctioning bodies. Finally, Section C will analyze the role of the state athletic
commissions as well as their inherent inability to regulate the sport effectively.
A Boxing Managers and Promoters
A manager is the professional fighter's primary representative regarding all
business dealings related to the sport.31 Typically, the manager is responsible for
everything from selecting a promoter for the fighter32 and negotiating the terms of
the promotional contract33 to selecting appropriate trainers and comermen 3 4
30 15 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6313 (Supp. m 1997).
31 See, e.g., Hearings on Boxing Rules Revision, supra note 12 (statement of Walter Stone,
counsel of the IBF) (detailing the representative powers of boxing managers); PHIL BERGER,
BLOOD SEASON: TYSON AND THE WORLD OF BOxING 126-30, 241-45, 262-65 (1996)
(detailing the control of Mike Tyson's career, including financial advice and public relations, by
managers Bill Cayton and Jim Jacobs, until Tyson signed a promotional contract with Don
King); see also generally THOMAS HAUSER, THE BLACK LIGHTS (1986) (detailing the
relationship between manager Mike Jones's and boxer Billy Costello-in which Jones helped
Costello choose comermen, a fight promoter, a trainer, and represented Costello in day-to-day
business dealings-as representative of a common boxer-manager relationship).32 See BERGER, supra note 31, at 226-29 (discussing the process of selecting a promoter
for Mike Tyson by comanagers Bill Cayton and Jim Jacobs); HAUSER, supra note 31, at 117-
19 (discussing the fact that a manager selects a promoter for his fighter based on the financial
compensation that the promoter may provide).
33 See BERGER, supra note 31, at 117-19 (discussing the negotiation process of a
promotional contract and the manager's role).
34 See id. at 40-41 (detailing manager Mike Jones's assistance in selecting the appropriate
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Because boxers rarely have the financial resources to cover training expenses
when they begin their careers,35 the fight manager pays the boxer's training
expenses as well as provides the fighter a stipend on which to live.36 In exchange
for these services, a manager usually takes one-third of the boxer's purse.37 This,
along with the manager's other responsibilities and the fighter's duties to the
manager, is contractually established.38
Despite the responsibilities inherent in managing a boxer, state regulations on
the licensing of managers differ drastically. In states where boxing is regulated
more heavily, such as Nevada and New Jersey,39 prospective managers are
screened before being licensed. In other states, anyone who pays the licensing fee
can become a manager.4 0
trainer for fighter Billy Costello).
35 See Hearings on Boxing Rules Revision, supra note 12 (statement of Shelly Finkel,
boxing manager) (describing how "many... fighters are from underprivileged
backgrounds... ."); The Professional Boxing Corporation Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 2212
Before the Comm. on Commerce, Trade, and Hazardous Materials, 103d Cong. 41 (1996)
(statement of Rep. Bill Richardson) ("Many of these athletes choose professional boxing to
escape the poverty and crime that permeates their world."); JOHN SUGDEN, BOXING AND
SOCIETY 52, 56-88 ("[B]oxing's cycle of exploitation is indeed vicious. It recruits the children
of the urban poor--those whose life chances and educational opportunities and achievements
are minimal."); id. (detailing examples of professional boxers in Hartford, Connecticut, who
grew up in poverty and looked to boxing as an escape from the inner city as typical of athletes
in the sport); Bill Barich, Singin' the Blues, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 9, 1996, at 70, 73
("Professional boxing has always thrived in an atmosphere of ... poverty... ?"); Mark Kriegel,
The Great (Almost) White Hope Boxer: Oscar DeLaHoya, ESQUIRE, Nov. 1996, at 78, 82
("Call it what it's been called before: Palookaville. .. where broken boxers live in poverty and
chagrin.').
36 5ee Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing Before the Comm. on Consumer Affairs,
Commerce, Science and Transp., 105th Cong. (1998), available in WESTLAW, U.S.
Testimony [hereinafter Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing] (statement of Cedric
Kushner, boxing promoter) (describing six-month investment of $35,000 in training and living
expenses for a local fighter that never produced any profit); BERGER, supra note 31, at 99
('Tyson got $500 for his first fight, a sum that [comanagers] Cayton and Jacobs anteed up
because if they had relied on what the promoter could afford, their fighter would have ended up
with pocket change."); HAUSER, supra note 31, at 40 (discussing manager Mike Jones's
responsibility as a trainer to "provide adequate training' for his contracted fighter).
37 See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (presentation by Fredric
G. Levin) (detailing the standard 33.3% "cut" the manager takes for his services).
38 See HAUSER, supra note 31, at 40 (detailing the contract that manager Mike Jones and
boxer Billy Costello signed); Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need for
Restraint and Consistency, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 459, 494 (1995) (detailing the fight contract
between fighter Max Baer and his managers).
3 9 See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (discussing the safety regulations of both
Nevada and New Jersey).
4 0 See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (statement of Cedric
Kushner) (discussing how he first became a New York State licensed boxing manager in 1982
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One of the most important tasks of the boxer's manager is to negotiate a
contract on behalf of the boxer with a fight promoter. 41 A promoter is responsible
for arranging fights between boxers.42 The promotional contract typically pays
the fighter a lump sum 43 upon signing, and it guarantees the promoter will
attempt to arrange a minimum number of bouts per year44 at a minimum purse for
each bout.45 This arrangement helps ensure that a fighter will have some level of
income during the early stages of his career.46 In exchange, the promoter usually
receives the bulk of the profits associated with each bout-such as site fees, and,
in larger contests, pay-per-view and broadcast rights.4 7
by paying "approximately $20 for the manager's license .... [A]Il I really was was a fan with a
few extra dollars, with absolutely zero experience in the sport. I knew nothing in regards to
being a competent boxing manager... ).
41 See HAUSER, supra note 31, at 117-18 (discussing managers' importance in choosing a
promoter); see also Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (statement of
Patrick C. English, counsel for Main Events, Inc.) (discussing the manager's negotiation role
with a promoter); Hearings on Boxing Rules Revision, supra note 12 (statement of Shelly
Finkel) (detailing the importance of a reputable manager in negotiating a contract with a
promoter to protect the fighter's interests).
42 See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (statement of Fredric G.
Levin) (listing the responsibilities of a fight promoter); id (statement of Patrick C. English)
(detailing the responsibility of a promoter to arrange matches between various boxers).
43 See id (statement of Cedric Kushner) (discussing a signing bonus of $100,000 to boxer
Tony Tucker in the mid-1980s, as well as a subsequent signing bonus Tucker received upon
agreeing to a contract with a new promoter three years later); RICHARD HOFFER, A SAVAGE
BusuNEss: THE COMEBACK AND COMEDOWN OF MIKE TYSON 20 (1998) (detailing how Tyson
received $35 million "up front" for re-signing a promotional contract with Don King in 1995).
44 See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (statement of Patrick
English) (indicating that although the contract purports to guarantee the fighter a minimum
number of fights each year, the promoter has a great deal of discretion in his attempts at
arranging fights); see also id. (statement of Cedric Kushner) (discussing his general minimum
bout-per-year provision); HAUSER, supra note 31, at 118 (detailing Don King's promotional
contract with boxer Billy Costello).
45 See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (statement of Cedric
Kushner) (detailing the standard minimum purse-per-bout provision in a promotional contract);
see id. (statement of Patrick C. English) (detailing the minimum-purse-per-bout provision used
in the contracts of Main Events, Inc.); see HAUSER, supra note 31, at 118 (describing the
minimum purse-per-bout provision boxer Billy Costello signed with promoter Don King).
46 See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (statement of Patrick C.
English) (discussing the effective use of minimum purse guarantees in giving a fighter a
guaranteed income at early stages in his professional career); see id. (statement of Cedric
Kushner) (detailing a promotional contract that provides a fighter with a minimum purse-per-
fight that gives a fighter a specified income, regardless of the promoter's profit); see also
HAUSER, supra note 31, at 118-26 (discussing the financial guarantees the minimum purse-per-
bout did-and did not-provide).
47 See Lane, supra note 13, at 205 (detailing the profits of promoters Bob Arum and Don
King from site promotion and pay-per-view fees); Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing,
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Most promotional contracts are exclusive 8 In other words, the fighter may
only compete in fights arranged by the promoter with whom he has signed. This
gives the promoter a great deal of power over the individual boxer's career, as the
fighter cannot simply choose his opponents unilaterally;49 instead, the promoter
can implicitly veto an opponent he disapproves of by refusing to arrange the
fight.50
The exclusivity clause also serves to hinder a fighter's ability to progress in
his career by preventing him from fighting higher-ranked opponents who have
signed with rival promoters.5 ' Unless both promoters agree to co-promote the
fight and divide the overall profits,5 2 the bout cannot be arranged. Because it is in
supra note 36 (statement of Fredric G. Levin):
The job of the promoter is to go out and get as much money as he possibly can get
from television, from the site, from foreign rights, from sponsorships, etc., and then to pay
the fighter as little as he possibly can. The reason for this is the difference goes to the
promoter.
However, a few high-profile fighters are able to share in profits that typically go to promoters.
See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (statement of Patrick C. English)
(stating that both Ray Leonard and Marvin Hagler had contracts that paid them 80-90% of the
promotional profits from site fees, pay-per-view fees, and endorsements); Lane, supra note 13,
at 206 (stating that both Evander Holyfield and George Foreman take a majority percentage of
"promotional" profits from fights).
48 See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (statement of Patrick C.
English) (detailing the exclusivity of promotional contracts); id. (statement of Cedric Kushner)
(stating that his standard promotional contract, like other promoters, gives him exclusive rights
to arrange his fighters' bouts); id. (statement of Fredric G. Levin) (detailing the standard
provision in a promotional contract that grants a promoter the exclusive right to arrange bouts
with the contracted boxer).
49 See id. (statement of Cedric Kushner) (testifying that a clause in his promotional
contract with Tony Tucker gave him the right to choose, with Tucker's input, Tucker's
opponents).
50 See Hearings on Boxing Rules Revision, supra note 12 (statement of Shelly Finkel)
(detailing a promoter's veto power in choosing a boxer's opponents); id. (statement of Larry
Hazzard, Chairman of the New Jersey State Athletic Control Board) (decrying a promoter's
ability to veto a professional boxer's opponents); Hearings on the Professional Boxing Safety
Act: S. 1991 Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp. (Sept. 1994) [hereinafter
Hearings on Boxing Safety Act] (statement of John H. Holladay, Jr., Chairman, South Carolina
Athletic Commission) (detailing a promoter's control in choosing a boxer's opponents to boost
a boxer's record).
51 See HAUSER, supra note 31, at 113 (quoting Don King in describing his contract with
heavyveight boxer Greg Page, "[U]nless Greg Page can fight opponents who are under
contract to [Don King Productions], his career will be at a standstill. And under [Don King
Productions'] promotional contracts with top contenders, they cannot fight for any other
promoter without... consent.").
5 2 See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (statement of Cedric
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the best interest of the individual promoter to keep as much of the profit as
possible, a promoter is more likely to arrange a fight between two fighters under
contract to him (and take all of the promotional profits) than to co-promote a bout
(and split promotional profits), regardless of which opponent would better further
the individual fighter's career.53
This control encourages new boxers to sign with a promoter who holds
contracts with a significant number of respected established boxers, thus giving
the new fighter a larger pool of attractive potential opponents. However, this
process also solidifies an individual promoter's hold over entire boxing weight
divisions. 54 For example, if one particular promoter has contractual control over
the champion and the top contenders in a particular weight class, a new boxer
knows he will have to sign with that promoter in order to have the best chance to
fight those contenders.55 Thus, the new fighter signs a long-term contract with the
promoter, giving the promoter contractual control over yet another prospective
contender and further perpetuating the promoter's control over that weight
division.
This contractual control usually lasts through the largest part of a boxer's
career because of the long-term nature of the promotional contract. A promoter
typically will sign a talented professional boxer to a three-year contract, with an
option exercisable by the promoter for an additional two years if the fighter wins a
major championship.56 Because the average boxer's career is relatively short
Kushner) (discussing his co-promotion of fighters); id. (statement of Fredric G. Levin)
(discussing the occasions when promoters must co-promote a fight); Hearings on Boxing Rules
Revision, supra note 12 (statement of Shelly Finkel) (discussing when it is economically viable
for a promoter to co-promote as opposed to selecting another opponent whom he has under
contract).
53 See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (statement of Fredric G.
Levin) (discussing the tendency for promoters to match two fighters whom they have under
contract, thus avoiding co-promotion).
54 See BERGER, supra note 31, at 42 (detailing Don King's hold over fighters in the
heavyweight division in the 1980s through ownership of the top contenders' contracts);
HAUSER, supra note 31, at 112-14 (detailing both Don King's and Bob Arum's control over
certain weight divisions).
55 See Hearings on Boxing Rules Revision, supra note 12 (statement of Roy Jones, Jr.)
(describing the pressures a boxer faces in signing with a promoter in order to fight for a
championship and detailing how he avoided signing with a promoter for several years while his
career stagnated; Jones fought for the middleweight title within a year after signing with Top
Rank, Inc.); Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (statement of Fredric G.
Levin) (describing how a talented boxer under contract to a promoter without the appropriate
connections within the sport may never challenge for a title).
56 See Hearings on Boxing Rules Revision, supra note 12 (statement of Shelly Finkel)
(detailing the use of the long-term contract). But see Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing,
supra note 36 (statement of Patrick C. English) (arguing that the proper use of a long-term
contract can be ethical and, when combined with the good faith use of a minimum fight-per-
year provision and a minimum purse-per-bout provision, can benefit both the boxer by
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compared with the length of promotional option contracts, 57 a fighter may be
locked into a contract with a promoter that lasts through the majority of his
competitive career. 58
During this time, if the fighter has the opportunity to challenge a champion
under contract to a different promoter, the challenger is usually required to sign an
option contract with the current champion's promoter (who will then buy out the
challenger's promoter).5 9 The contract typically provides that if the challenger
wins the title, the promoter holding the option has the right to arrange the new
champion's future fights.60 As an example, in order to fight heavyweight
champion Mike Tyson in 1990, James "Buster" Douglas had to sign an option
contract with Tyson's promoter Don King. When Douglas won the
championship, it enacted a clause in the contract that made King his exclusive
promoter for however long Douglas should keep the title, plus two years.61 Thus,
Douglas had to fight under King for his entire reign as champion, whether it
lasted ten days or ten years-plus an additional two years after that.
A final facet of the relationship between the manager and the promoter which
potentially gives both parties an inequitable amount of power over the individual
boxer, is the collusion that often exists in manager-promoter relations.62 Because
a promoter negotiates with a boxer for a minimum compensation amount for each
providing guaranteed income, and the promoter by providing security on an investment that
wvill likely lose money during the first part of the contract); see also id (statement of Cedric
Kushner) (detailing how the long-term contract is the only way a promoter can earn a profit on
a fighter with whom he usually loses money early in the contract term).
57 See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (statement of Fredric G.
Levin) (stating that the long-term promotional contract, compared to the short professional
career of the average fighter, often lasts for the prime earning years of a boxer's life in the
sport).
5 8 See id.; cf Hearing on Boxing Rules Revision, supra note 12 (statement of Mike Tyson)
(discussing how a professional fighter needs protection from promoters "eager to lock up a
talented fighter by way of complex agreements that may last for many years").
59 See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (statement of Cedric
Kushner) (describing the use of option agreements between promoters); id (statement of Roy
Jones, Jr.) ("In order to get a Championship fight, you have just about got to give 'Options' to
the Champion's promoter."); Hearings on Boxing Rules Revision, supra note 12 (statement of
Shelly Finkel) ("Can you imagine a scenario where the Utah Jazz would not be allowed to play
the Chicago Bulls for the NBA Championship unless the owner of the Utah Jazz gave Jerry
Reinsdorf ownership in his team? Never! But in boxing this is the ordinary course of
business.'). But see id (statement of Walter Stone, General Counsel, IBF) (defending the use of
the option contract as "good business practice[s]').
60 See, e.g., Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (statement of Cedric
Kushner).
61 See id (statement of Patrick C. English) (describing promotional contracts that, on the
surface, may appear for a specified length, but, in practice, are open-ended, extending for the
most valuable part of a professional fighter's career).
62 See Hearings on Boxing Rules Revision, supra note 12 (statement of Shelly Finkel).
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fight and keeps the remaining profits, his interests conflict with those of the boxer
and the manager (who technically represents the boxer's financial interests and
takes a share in his purse).
However, in practice, a particular boxer's manager is often a business
associate,63 family member, or even employee of the boxer's promoterr'4 This
calls into question the arm's length relationship that should exist between the
parties negotiating the promotional contract.65 As an example, many of the
fighters under contract to Don King, one of the most powerful promoters in the
sport, are managed by his stepson, Carl, an employee of Don King Productions.66
This gives King not only inequitable bargaining power, but a stake through his
son of the fighter's purse and leaves the boxer without a representative that is
clearly supporting his interests. Thus, while the manager and the promoter
represent divergent interests in theory, the line between the two has become
increasingly blurred, with the promoter taking increasing control of the fighter's
career.
67
B. The Sanctioning Bodies
Unlike other professional sports, boxing does not have a central organizing
body that establishes rules, holds contests, and names champions. Instead, the
63 See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (letter from Dennis C.
Vacco, Attorney General for the State of New York) (describing managers who have their
fighters sign with promoters who are business associates of the manager).
64 See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (letter from Dennis C.
Vacco); HAUSER, supra note 31, at 109-11 (describing the employment relationship between
boxing managers and promoters).
65 See Hearings on Boxing Rules Revision, supra note 12 (statement of Shelly Finkel) ('I
know of instances where fighters' managers are mere instruments of the promoter and, so, there
is no arm[']s length bargaining to protect the fighters' basic business interest.").
66 See BERGER, supra note 31, at 42 ('in more than a few instances, [Don King's] stepson,
Carl, was the manager of the same fighters that King promoted, a parlay that was well within
the rules of the sport, but surely had the potential for exploitation.); HAUSER, supra note 31, at
109-12.
67 See Hearings on the Health and Safety of Professional Boxing, supra note 50, at 58
(statement of Eddy Futch) ('Tjhe line between the manager and the promoter has become so
dim that it is hardly visible."); HAUSER, supra note 31, at 110 (detailing how on at least three
occasions in the 1980s fights promoted by Don King took place in which his stepson, Carl, was
the manager of both fighters). Summing up the situation, boxing journalist Michael Katz said,
"[f]irst, the fighter signs a promotional contract with Don King. Then the manager signs over a
piece of the boxer to Carl King. Finally the fighter gets a title bout. In this comer, a Don King
fighter. In that comer, a Don King fighter. Guess who wins." Id. Cf Hearings on the Health
and Safety of Professional Boxing, supra note 50, at 93 (statement of John H. Hollady, Jr.,
Chairman of the South Carolina State Athletic Commission) ("Many promoters and managers
take advantage of these boxers who are often uneducated. They are expecting help from the
very people who are sacrificing them to the wolves for the fans.").
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sport is overseen by a number of sanctioning agencies, each with different rules,
weight classes, and champions.68
Sanctioning agencies range from international organizations that name world
champions to local governing bodies that associate their names with state or
national titles.69 However, regardless of the sanctioning organization, its main
usefulness to the professional fighter is in the title bout it licenses.70 For example,
the three most prestigious sanctioning organizations-the World Boxing Council
(WBC), the International Boxing Federation (1BF), and the World Boxing
Association (WBA)-all recognize world champions at various weight classes. 71
Because of the "prestige" of these organizations relative to other agencies, the
championship titles of these organizations are more coveted than a "world
championship" from another sanctioning body.72
Indeed, the sanctioning bodies do little more than operate to perpetuate their
world championship titles. The organizations exist solely to sanction their own
title fights and elimination bouts that lead to title fights and to rank boxers who
68 It has been argued that the prevalence of sanctioning agencies and their attendant
champions, many of whom are not recognized as champions by the other sanctioning agencies
dilutes the sport. See Hearings on Boxing Rules Revision, supra note 12 (statement of Shelly
Finkel) ("The proliferation of these sanctioning bodies has created literally hundreds of world
titles in dozens of divisions. This is confusing to the public and generally dilutes the value of a
'world title' to the point where [the title] has become relatively insignificant!"); Hearings on the
Health and Safety ofProfessional Boxing, supra note 50 (statement of Eddy Futch) (stating that
some of the champions recognized today would not be good enough to fight a preliminary bout
in the 1950s when fewer champions were recognized). For example, in January 1999, the three
major sanctioning bodies-the WBC, the WBA, and the IBF--recognized a total of sixty-eight
world champions in eighteen different weight classes. See Darryl Howerton, Boxing Special
Report: A Bloody Mess?, SPORT, Feb. 1999, at 46, 49 (discussing the number of champions
whose names are not known to the general public). But see Hearings on Boxing Rules Revision,
supra note 12 (statement of Walter Stone, counsel for the IBF) ("The proliferation of
sanctioning organizations was a direct result of the greed of television, not of sanctioning
organizations").
69 See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (statement of Patrick C.
English) (describing the variety and sweep of sanctioning bodies).
70 See Hearings on the Health and Safety of Professional Boxing, supra note 50, at 53
(statement of Dr. Albert Capana) (describing the boxer as bowing to the sanctioning body
because of the belt it holds); Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36
(statement of Fredric G. Levin) (stating that a boxer's only interest in a sanctioning body is in
the championship belts it authorizes).
71 See HAUSER, supra note 31, at 93-103 (detailing the authority and scope of the major
sanctioning organizations).
72 See, e.g., Harry Mullan, Tyson's Return Brings Mixed Blessing, FIN. TIMEs (London),
Dec. 31, 1998, at 12 (discussing Tyson's consideration of fighting World Boxing Organization
(WBO) heavyweight champion Herbie Hide: "Hide has potential, and could yet enter the big
picture should Tyson decide that even a WBO belt is better than nothing.").
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may have an opportunity to fight for their title 7 3 Thus, while each of the
organizations has its own set of rules and safety standards for bouts it sanctions,74
these rules only apply to title and elimination fights that the organizations oversee.
Yet, one of the most important features of a sanctioning body during a
boxer's career is the organization's ranking system.75 This system determines
when the boxer may fight for a title if he is a contender, or against whom he will
defend his title76 if he is the champion. However, the sanctioning bodies follow
no published objective criteria for determining a fighter's ranldng.77 This lack of
disclosure or oversight allows organization administrators to manipulate the
ranking systems to give preferred fighters a title shot, and, therefore, a bigger
payday; or conversely, to allow a preferred, marketable champion to face lesser
quality "number-one-ranked opponents" in order to hold his title longer.7 8 This
7 3 See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (statement of Fredric G.
Levin) (stating the purpose of the sanctioning bodies); Hearings on Boxing Rules Revision,
supra note 12 (statement of Walter Stone, counsel for the IBF) (detailing the procedures of the
IBF). In exchange for lending its endorsement to a title match, the organization receives a
sanctioning fee which is typically 3% of the total purse and paid by each fighter. See Hearings
on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (statement of Fredric G. Levin). Once the boxer
wins the organization's title, he agrees to compete in places, against opponents, and under the
rules specified by the sanctioning organization. See id. (statement of Patrick C. English).
74 See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (statement of Fredric G.
Levin) (criticizing the variety of rules between the sanctioning bodies).
7 5 See S. REP. NO. 103-408, at 13 (1994) ("Ranking boxers is among the sanctioning
bodies' most important functions. If a boxer is not ranked by a sanctioning body, the boxer has
no chance of competing for that sanctioning body's title and is effectively denied the
opportunity for the substantial earnings that can come with a title bout.").
7 6 See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (statement of Patrick
English) (stating that each of the organizations has rules mandating defenses against the
number-one-ranked challengers, but these rules are enforced sporadically, depending on the
whims of the organizations' councils); HAUSER, supra note 31, at 99 (quoting former New
York Times boxing columnist Michael Katz, "WBC rules are like the Soviet Constitution. They
only work on paper," and promoter Bob Arum, "The [WBC] rules are an ever-changing series
of directives that apply to certain people and certain entities at different times and not to
others.").
77 See Hearings on Boxing Rules Revision, supra note 12 (statement of Sen. John
McCain) ("The sanctioning organizations comprise a byzantine and largely arbitrary system of
rating fighters that is not primarily on their skills and successes in the ring."). But see Hearings
on Boxing Rules Revision, supra note 12 (statement of Walter Stone, counsel for the IBF)
(defending the lack of objective ranking criteria between the different sanctioning bodies as a
result of the differing goals of each sanctioning organization).
7 8 See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (statement of Patrick C.
English) (describing the breakdown of the ranking system allowing champions to avoid worthy
contenders by fighting a series of "bums" who are ranked as mandatory challengers). For
example, one insider noted:
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argument is bolstered by allegations that certain powerful promoters within the
sport hold influence with particular sanctioning agencies, agreeing to funnel their
marketable fighters into bouts authorized by that sanctioning agency in exchange
for preferential treatment for their entire stable of fighters.7 9 Thus, the fighter's
career path continues to be controlled by the promoter, through the promoter's
influence within the sanctioning organizations.
C. The State Regulatory Agencies
Before 1996, the only governmental regulation of boxing was at the state
level.80 Because of this, protection of fighters varied widely, depending upon the
state in which they fought.81 States such as Nevada and New Jersey had extensive
regulations governing the sport,82 mandating medical exams for fighters before
Advancement in boxing is arbitrary and capricious.... [1]n boxing a handfil of
men--too many of them corrupt-determine who fights, and fighters do their best to avoid
opponents who can beat them .... The professional worlds of tennis and golf would never
tolerate such a situation. But... it's clear that boxing's major sanctioning bodies often
operate in precisely that manner.
BERGER, supra note 31, at 94.
79 See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (statement of Fredric G.
Levin) (stating that, "[o]ver the years, it has been documented that different promoters control
different organizations," and describing the preferential treatment sanctioning agencies give
promoters); BERGER, supra note 31, at 230-35 (detailing Don King's influence with the WBC
and Bob Arum's influence with the IBF). But see HAUSER, supra note 31, at 97 (stating the
opinion among many observers that Don King does not exert improper influence over the
WBC, contrary to popular belief).
80 The Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996 imposed minimum federal guidelines on
the sport. For a detailed discussion of this statute, see infra notes 141-60 and accompanying
text
8 1 See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (statement of Patrick C.
English) ('Imagine a major professional sport where the rules change as the participants cross
state lines.... It is obvious that a professional sport cannot run that way-and yet this is
precisely the way boxing is... run."); Hearings on the Health and Safety of Professional
Boxing, supra note 50, at 26 (statement of Al Bernstein, professional sports broadcaster)
(detailing the fact that boxing rules differ widely from state to state).
82 See Hearings on Boxing Rules Revision, supra note 12 (statement of Larry Hazzard,
New Jersey Athletic Control Board Comm'r) (discussing New Jersey boxing regulations that
include multiple medical evaluations to license boxers, five-year limits on boxer promotional
contracts, and prohibition of boxer-manager contractual options); Hearings on the Health and
Safety of Professional Boxing, supra note 50, at 59 (statement of Dr. Flip Homansky)
(discussing the evaluative role a ringside physician in Nevada plays in determining whether to
stop a fight); id. at 42 (statement of Jerome Coffee, member, Nevada State Athletic
Commission) (discussing the drug testing procedures used in Nevada before and after a fight);
id. at 45 (statement of Dr. Albert Capanna) (stating the medical certification requirements of a
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each bout, requiring paramedics and licensed physicians to be present at ringside
during fights, and providing for license suspensions for boxers considered
medically unable to fight.83 By contrast, other states had no regulations. 84
Medical personnel were not required to be present during the bout, nor was a
fighter required to submit to a pre-fight medical examination. In other words, it
was as easy to obtain permission to box-with all of its attendant risks of injury-
as it was to go fly-fishing.
Between these two extremes lay the majority of states-jurisdictions that had
agency regulations that provided differing levels of protection and registration.85
Yet, these states often did not employ personnel who were knowledgeable in the
sport, 86 thus leaving many of the regulations unenforced. 87
This diversity of regulations and varying degrees of regulatory enforcement
from state to state allowed boxers and promoters to fight in jurisdictions that were
most advantageous to them, regardless of safety concerns. 88 For example, if a
fighter had been knocked out on January 1 while in Nevada, he would be
medically prohibited from fighting within the state for at least thirty days.89
However, the fighter may simply go to North Dakota instead and fight on January
3, even though he continued to suffer the effects of his knockout two days earlier.
The Professional Boxing Safety Act partially solves this problem by requiring
that each state honor the mbdical suspensions issued by another state.90 However,
a fighter could continue to fight in states with the least stringent medical
certification procedures, thus ensuring that he is never suspended in the first place.
Additionally, while all states are required to administer bouts under some level of
boxer in Nevada are more stringent than in most other states).
83 See Hearings on Boxing Rules Revision, supra note 12 (statement of Larry Hazzard,
New Jersey Athletic Control Board Comn'r); Hearings on the Health and Safety of
Professional Boxing, supra note 50, at 59 (statement of Dr. Flip Homansky); id. at 45
(statement of Dr. Albert Capanna).
84 See S. REp. NO. 103-408, at 4 (1994) ('CThere is no governmental regulation of boxing
in Colorado, South Dakota, and Wyoming, although boxing is not illegal in those states.").
85 See id at 5; see also Hearings on the Health and Safety of Professional Boxing, supra
note 50, at 21 (statement of Al Bemstein, professional sports broadcaster).
86 See Hearings on the Health and Safety of Professional Boxing, supra note 50, at 45
(statement of Albert Capanna) (stating the lack of enforced regulations in many states); id at 56
(statement of Eddy Futch) (detailing his attempts to bring venues in North Dakota "up to [the
state's] standards").
87 See id.; S. REP. No. 103-408, at4 (1994).
88 See Hearings on the Health and Safety of Professional Boxing, supra note 50, at 21
(statement of Al Bemstein, professional sports broadcaster).
89 See Hearings on Boxing Rules Revision, supra note 12 (statement of Lany Hazzard,
New Jersey Athletic Control Board Comm'r).
90 Cf infra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.
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regulation, regulatory enforcement remains lax in many jurisdictions.91
The variety of state regulations also applies to the licensing of boxing
managers and promoters.9 2 Some states require background checks and
commission approval before licensing managers and promoters, while others
continue to require that prospective managers and promoters merely pay a fee in
order to operate within the state.93 In addition, there is no national registration
system for boxing managers and promoters, allowing unscrupulous managers or
promoters under investigation in one state to continue to operate in other
jurisdictions.9 4 In 1994 for example, Rick Parker had his promoter's license
revoked by the Florida State Athletic Commission after allegations that he "fixed
fights" with two of his boxers.95 While still under investigation, Parker was
allowed to promote fights in other jurisdictions.96 Thus, he was able to continue
an-anging fights for his boxers although he was suspected of criminal fraud.
91 See supra note 86.
92 See, e.g., Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (statement of Cedric
Kushner); Hearings on the Health and Safety of Professional Boxing, supra note 50, at 21
(statement of Al Bernstein, professional sports broadcaster).
93 See Hearings on Business Practices in Boxing, supra note 36 (statement of Cedric
Kushner) (stating that he merely had to pay a fee to first become licensed as a promoter). While
New York has since increased its licensing requirements, Kushner stated other states continue
to require that promoters pay a fee as the sole restriction to licensing. Id. See also S. REP. No.
103-408, at 5-6 (1994). The Report describes licensing as follows:
[L]icensing of other boxing participants such as managers, matchmakers and
comermen, is generally automatic in most states subject to the payment of the required
licensing fee. Citing lack of staff and resources, state boxing regulators generally do not
inquire into either the experience or backgrounds of applicants for boxing licenses.
Id.
94 See Hearings on the Health and Safety of Professional Boxing, supra note 50
(statement of Sen. John McCain).
95 See, e.g., Gerard Shields & Barry Cooper, FBI Investigates Boxing Promoter, TH
ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 15, 1994, at CI (recounting allegations that Parker coerced a fighter
under contract to lose intentionally, and the FBI's subsequent investigation); Gerard Shields &
Barry Cooper, Third Fighter Accuses Parker ofFight-Fixing, THE ORLANDo SENI'NEL, Apr. 3,
1994, at D1 (detailing accusations by boxer Terry Davis that Parker attempted to coerce him
into "throwing" a fight against Riddick Bowe).
96 See Hearings on the Health and Safety of Professional Boxing, supra note 50, at 4
(statement of Sen. John McCain). Senator McCain stated:
The recent situation in Florida... [regarding Parker] is a disturbing example of the
unethical and often illegal practices that are rampant in the professional boxing industry
today. I find it astounding that this individual is apparently being allowed by several other
States to play an active role in professional boxing.
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III. A HISTORY OF ATrEMPTs AT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
Because of the problems inherent within the sport, Congress has considered
regulating professional boxing several times over the past forty years. However,
due to the controversial nature of regulating a private athletic industry,97 little
meaningful headway has been made. Indeed, it took thirty-six years from the first
series of investigations into the sport for Congress to enact a law requiring all
states to institute some level of boxing safety guidelines.98 Section A of this Part
will detail the history of attempts at regulation of the sport from the 1960s through
the passage of the Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996 and its subsequent
proposed amendments. Section B will then analyze the Act and detail the
weaknesses that keep it from adequately protecting professional fighters.
A Proposed Regulation
Although the majority of proposed federal boxing legislation has focused on
safety issues, allegations of corrupt practices within the sport have sparked most
congressional inquiries into the subject. Congress first considered regulating
boxing in 1960, when Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver called hearings on
reforming the industry.99 Kefauver, the Chair of the Senate Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly, ordered the hearings as a result of allegations of Mafia
ties and claims of fight-fixing by heavyweight world champion Sonny Liston.100
As a result, Kefauver sponsored legislation calling for the Justice Department
to form a federal boxing commission.10 1 However, his efforts were thwarted by
Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who believed that the federal government
should not intervene in the sport.102 Nonetheless, many observers continued to
believe that the sport needed some kind of outside regulation in order to survive.
For example, former heavyweight champion Jack Dempsey, who testified before
Kefauver's investigation, stated, "The fight game is just about on the way
out.... [I]t's ready to be buried if something isn't done, and fast." 103
Questions over potential fight-fixing also launched the first inquiries of the
97 See infra notes 130-40 and accompanying text
98 See infra notes 141-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Professional
Boxing Safety Act of 1996.
99 See Professional Boxing: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. (1960); see also Howard, supra note 9, at 108-
11 (providing an additional analysis of the Kefauver investigations and federal attempts at
boxing regulation); Peter E. Millspaugh, The Federal Regulation of Professional Boxing: Will
Congress Answer the Bell?, 19 SETON HALLLEGIS. J. 33,33-46 (1994).
100 See THF RING, supra note 12, at 134.
101 See id; see also S. REP. No: 103-408, at 18 (1994).
102 See THE RING, supra note 12, at 134.
103 Id.
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1990s into federal boxing reform. In 1992, Delaware Senator William Roth
ordered an inquiry into the sport after a February world title fight between
middleweight champion James Toney and journeyman David Tiberi. 10 4 Although
most ringside experts believed that Tiberi had won the fight handily,'0 5 the judges
awarded a split decision to Toney.10 6 During the investigation, and in a suit filed
against promoter Bob Arum and the IBF (the promoter and sanctioning body of
the bout respectively), 10 7 Tiberi stated that the IBF "fixes fights so
the... champion will retain his title in order to increase popular interest in the
current champion, which in turn increases the profitability of fights involving that
champion."' 08 While the investigation failed to prove conclusively that the IBF
was involved in fight fixing,109 it found that two of the three judges in the New
Jersey fight were unlicensed in the state and unfamiliar with the state's scoring
practices. 110
The investigations continued after another controversial bout in September
1993 between Julio Caesar Chavez and Pernell Whitaker.111 After questioning
130 members of the boxing industry, the Senate Subcommittee found that too
much control by promoters and sanctioning bodies, combined with too little
protection from state regulatory agencies, placed fighters in physical danger
within the ring and increased their susceptibility to managerial abuse outside the
ring.112
As a result of these investigations, Senator Roth introduced the Professional
104 See 138 CoNG. REC. S5658, S5658 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1992) (statement of Sen. Roth);
see also Howard, supra note 9, at 109.
105 See 141 CONG. REC. S16513, S16513 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1995). Announcer Alex
Wallau, commenting on the fight for ABC, described the result as the "most disgusting decision
I have ever seen." Id. at S16513. Shortly after the fight itself, Donald Trump, owner of the
Trump Taj Mahal Casino Resort where the fight was held, said, 'I've watched a lot of bad
decisions over the years, but this one was the worst, and I'm tired of it. There will be no more
fights in Atlantic City until this situation is rectified." See Bob Mutter, Judge Lerch Taking
Heat in Toney-Tiberi Rhubarb, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Feb. 28, 1992, at 93.
106 See Mutter, supra note 105, at 93.
107 See Kondrath v. Arum, 881 F. Supp. 925, 927 (Del. 1995) (ruling that plaintiff's suit
alleging violations of both federal and state racketeering statutes, as well as fraud and breach of
fiduciary duties, be transferred to state court).
108 i at 927.
109 See S. REP. No. 103-408, at 25 (1994). The investigation did show that boxing
promoter Al Certo had ties with the Genovese crime family. However, there was no direct
proof that any Mafia influence was exerted on the fight itself. Id. at 28.
110 See id. at29.
111 See 139 CONG. REC. S13129, S13129 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1993). The fight was ruled a
draw, despite the opinion of most observers that Whitaker dominated the fight.
112 See id. at S13129 ("Our investigation revealed that the current regulatory system is no
better at protecting a boxer's health and safety than it is in protecting the sport from
unfaimess.').
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Boxing Corporation Act of 1993.11 3 Under the bill, a self-funded government
corporation known as the Professional Boxing Corporation (PBC) would regulate
boxing nationwide. The executive board 'f this Corporation would have authority
to license all boxing personnel and events, and to register boxers, fight physicians,
promoters, and managers. 114 The bill also empowered the PBC to prohibit fights
that violated its minimum standards 115 as well as to review the role of the private
sanctioning bodies in the sport.116 The bill, like later attempts at federal boxing
legislation, was controversial, with both legislators and members of the sport
divided on its merits. 117
The Professional Boxing Corporation Act and much of the similar legislation
that followed, were doomed to congressional inaction, legislative compromise,
and outside opposition. Congress took no action on the boxing corporation
proposal, killing the bill.118 The next year, the Professional Boxing Safety Act of
1994119 was introduced by New Mexico Congressman Bill Richardson as a
compromise between those people that favored full-scale boxing regulation and
those that were against federal intervention. 120 The bill provided for the same
broad safety measures as the original Professional Boxing Corporation Act
without the use of a federal government corporation and its associated
expenses. 121
This new registry for professional fighters operated through a federal
clearinghouse. 122 Fighters would be issued licenses in the form of identification
cards that they would be required to show at the weigh-in before each fight in
113 S. 1189, 103d Cong. (1993). The bill was also introduced in the House by New
Mexico Congressman Bill Richardson. See H.R. 2607, 103d Cong. (1993).114 See Professional Boxing Corporation Act, S. 1189, 103rd Cong., § 8 (1993).
115 See id. § 8(h)(5).
116 See id § 8(d)(5)(B)(10).
1 17 See Richard O'Brien, A New Urgency, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 5, 1993, at 11, 11
(detailing the Roth investigation and support of the reform legislation by stating, "boxing's
lawlessness merit[s] closer scrutiny by Washington"); Bill Richardson, With Federal
Regulation Dispute Never Would Have Happened, USA TODAY, Mar. 21, 1991, at 1 IC
(arguing in support of the bill). But see Joseph Deitch, Lany Hazzard; Commissioner Keeps
His Eye on Boxing, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 23, 1993, at 13NJ, 3 (New Jersey State Boxing
Commissioner Larry Hazzard, who expressed concern over the possibility that federal
legislators who are not knowledgeable about boxing might overregulate).
118 See Professional Boxing Corporation Act of 1993, available in LEXIS, LEGIS
Library, Bltl03 File.
119 See generally Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1994, S. 1991, 103d Cong. (1994).
120 See Howard, supra note 9, at 111 (1997). See also Marcus Hayes, Punch Drunk:
Reform Slow in Coming in the U.S., HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 18, 1996, at 10 (describing the
Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1994 as a "toothless version" of the Professional Boxing
Corporation Act).
121 See Howard, supra note 9, at 111.
122 See Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1994, S. 1991, 103d Cong. § 7 (1994).
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which they were involved.123 State boxing commissions would then be required
to report the results of these bouts, along with any subsequent fighter suspensions,
within forty-eight hours. 124 In most cases, each state would then be required to
honor the license suspensions issued by another state. 125
After this bill failed to reach a congressional vote,126 Senator McCain
introduced identical legislation-The Professional Boxing Safety Act of
1995 127 -the following year. Again, the bill died, only to be replaced by an
identical bill in 1996.
In addition to legislative inaction 128 and division in Congress over how
severely the sport should be regulated,129 resistance among boxing insiders has
slowed movements to federal reform.130 Indeed, the most ardent critics of federal
boxing regulation are among the sport's most powerful administrators: the heads
of the sport's sanctioning bodies and boxing promoters. t31 Although refusing to
testify before Congress on the matter,132 promoter Don King has said that federal
regulation of boxing would deprive the sport of an open economic market.
According to King, "Boxing is the poorest of all sports.... Once federal
regulation would come into boxing, people like myself would never have an
opportunity to be part of the boxing hierarchy." 133
Another sanctioning body administrator, Bob Lee, President of the IBF, came
out against federal regulation of the sport while testifying before Congress in its
123 See id § 5(b).
124 See id. § 7(a).
125 See id § 6(2)(D). An exception existed for certain administrative suspensions in which
the fighter obtained prior approval from the suspending state before fighting in another state.
See id § 6(2)-(3).
12 6 See Professional Boxing Corporation Act of 1993, available in LEXIS, LEGIS
Library, Bltl03 File.
127 S. 187, 104th Cong. (1995).
12 8 Certainly another reason is the fact that Congress has only a finite legislation period,
and regulating boxing may come low on the list of issues to consider. Or, as boxing manager Al
Certo said before testifying, 'Drugs are the problem. AIDS is the problem. Who gives a
about boxing?" See O'Brien, supra note 117, at 11.
12 9 See Bob Brubaker, Controversy Stirs Call for Legislation: New Mexico's Richardson
Seeks to Regulate Boxing, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1990, at C3 (quoting New Mexico
Congressman Bill Richardson as saying, "In the past there's been opposition from a
Republican administration saying we don't need anymore regulation.... The opposition has
said that since other professional sports aren't regulated, boxing shouldn't be either.");
Millspaugh, supra note 99, at 63-67.
130 See, eg., Hearings on Boxing Rules Revision, supra note 12 (statement of Walter
Stone, counsel for the IBF).
131 For a more detailed description of the role of promoters and sanctioning agencies
within the sport, see supra notes 41-79 and accompanying text.
132 See Hearings on Boxing Rules Revision, supra note 12 (statement of Sen. McCain).
133 See Brubaker, supra note 129, at C3.
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investigation of the 1992 Toney-Tiberi fight.134 While Lee-whose organization
sanctioned the fight and picked its judges-pleaded the Fifth Amendment on any
questions specific to the bout itself,135 he stated that he felt calls for regulation
due to bad decisions within the sport were unjustified. According to Lee, "Boxing
has become the whipping boy in sports. A bad call in football or baseball can be
made and no one talks about fixes, but in this sport, they seem to feel that
anything that happens is a result of shenanigans."'136
Even those insiders who favor federal boxing regulation have expressed
worries about the government becoming too involved in a sport in which it knows
relatively little. Larry Hazzard, the Chairman of the New Jersey State Athletic
Control Board, has stated that while he favored some form of federal regulation,
"[w]hat we don't need is a politician who doesn't know a left hook from a fish
hook to sit up there and dictate to knowledgeable boxing people."'137
Despite this controversy, in 1997, with the support of the AFL-CIO and the
National Football League Player's Association, 138 Congress passed The
Professional Boxing Safety Act.139 While hailed by its supporters as a "solid first
step" 140 in providing safer boxing conditions, it fails to give fighters an
appropriate level of either physical safety within the ring or financial security
outside of it.
B. An Analysis of The Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996
While the Professional Boxing Safety Act (the Act) is an effective effort in
establishing nationwide minimum standards for the sport, the Act fails to protect
boxers from exploitation at the hands of managers and promoters or to issue a
uniform level of applicable safety regulations. Thus, fighters continue to be left
unprotected both inside and outside the ring, during and after their careers.
First, although the Act's primary goal is to render the sport itself physically
safer for fighters,' 4 ' the statute establishes only the bare minimum in the way of
134 See 138 CONG. REC. S5658, S5660 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1992).
135 See Ron Borges, Boxing's Black Eye: A Rash of Scandals and Chaos Have Left the
Sport Reeling, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 31, 1993, at 65.
136 Id.
137 Deitch, supra note 117, at 3.
138 See Committee to Organize Professional Boxing in the U.S. Federation of
Professional Athletes (AFL-CIO) (visited Oct. 25, 1999)
<http://www.uhu.com/boxing/union.htm>.
139 15 U.S.C. Chapter 89 (Supp. 1 1997).
140 See Committee to Organize Professional Boxing in the US. Federation of
Professional Athletes (AFL-CIO) (visited Oct. 25, 1999)
<http://wwwv.uhu.com/boxingfunion.htm>.
141 See 15 U.S.C. § 6302 (Supp. 1 1997) (describing the first purpose of the statute as
improving "the system of safety precautions that protects the welfare of professional boxers").
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uniform safety regulations. Thus, the Act requires only that: (1) a licensed
physician certify that the boxer is fit to compete; (2) an ambulance or paramedics
with resuscitation equipment be present at each fight; (3) a physician be present at
ringside; and (4) each participating boxer carry health insurance. 142 The Act
makes no reference to the maximum length of a fight, the maximum or minimum
weight of boxing gloves or other equipment, all of which have been shown to
have an impact on fighter safety. 143 In these areas, states and sanctioning agencies
are free to legislate (or not) at their discretion. Indeed, the Act's requirement of an
ambulance or medical personnel with resuscitative equipment is phrased only as a
default rule. A state need not meet this requirement if its boxing commission
expressly rules that the equipment is not necessary.144
The Act also places some measure of administration in states that do not have
boxing regulations. According to the Act, these states must allow another
jurisdiction's boxing commission to supervise any bouts the non-regulated state
holds.145 However, this allows promoters to "shop" for the most preferable state
commission, as a promoter wishing to hold a bout in a state without a boxing
commission-Colorado, for example146-may merely request that a state with
the most lax regulations supervise the bout. While this requirement at least
establishes some sort of governmental supervision, it still leaves open the
possibility for abuse at the hands of promoters and managers.
Finally, the Act requires all boxers wishing to fight in the United States to
register and receive a photo identification card.147 The results of all of a given
fighter's bouts, as well as information regarding medical and administrative
suspensions, are then required to be reported to the national clearinghouse. 148
This photo registration prevents fighters who were placed on medical suspension
by one state from fighting under an alias in another state. However, fighters
suspended for other reasons may continue to box in other states because the law
requires jurisdictions to honor only the medical suspension of a reporting state.149
142 See 15 U.S.C. § 6304 (Supp. i1 1997).
143 See, e.g., Soren Schmidt-Olsen et al., Amateur Boxing in Denmark; The Effect of Some
Preventative Measures, 18 THE AM. J. OF SPORTS MEDICRnE, 98, 98 (1990); Kevin Walsh,
Boxing: Regulating a Health Hazard, 11 J. CONTEM. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 63, 70-75
(discussing the applicability of various safety measures).
144 See 15 U.S.C. § 6304(2) (Supp. m 1997) (requiring an ambulance or paramedics with
resuscitating equipment unless "othenvise expressly provided under regulation of a boxing
commission promulgated subsequent to" the enactment of this Act).
14 5 See 15 U.S.C. § 6303 (Supp. 111 1997) ("No person may arrange, promote, organize,
produce, or fight in a professional boxing match held in a State that does not have a boxing
commission unless the match is supervised by a boxing commission from another State .. .
14 6 See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
147 See 15 U.S.C. § 6305 (Supp. I 1997).
14 8 See id § 6307.
14 9 See id. § 6306(a)(2).
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Indeed, the weakness of this section of the Act was most glaringly exposed
after Mike Tyson was indefinitely suspended by the Nevada State Athletic
Commission when Tyson bit LBF heavyweight champion Evander Holyfield's ear
in a 1997 bout.150 While still under the Nevada-imposed license revocation,
Tyson applied to the New Jersey State Athletic Commission1 51 for a license to
fight in that state. In theory, Tyson, who was being disciplined for his conduct in
Nevada, could still fight anywhere else. However, complete exposure of the
weakness of this part of the Act was averted when Tyson withdrew his New
Jersey application and instead re-applied in Nevada. 152
Despite the weaknesses of what is specifically provided in the Act, it is what
the Act does not include that continues to allow exploitation. First, although the
Act requires national licensing and reporting of boxers themselves, it places no
such demands on promoters, managers, or trainers. Therefore, a promoter who
has had his license revoked in one state for fight fixing may still promote fights in
another state; and a manager investigated by a state's Attorney General's office
for embezzlement of his fighter's pay may continue to manage boxers throughout
the rest of the country. 153 This lack of any national licensing or registration
system for the promotional and managerial personnel of the sport continues to
leave fighters open to financial abuse.
The Act also makes no provision for the funding of a pension plan for retired
boxers. 154 A pension plan is a necessary financial option because most of the
nation's 5,000 career boxers are 'joumeymen"--fighters who earn, on average,
less than $20,000 a year during their short careers. 155 Unlike other professional
sports, whose leagues have established pension funds for their ex-athletes, 156
most retired fighters have no such financial option because of the sport's current
150 See Jack Thompson, Tyson Expects Lifetime Ban in Wake of Holyfield Fight, CHIC.
TRIB., Nov. 4, 1997, at 2.
151 See Royce Feour, Bill Would End Fight Loophole, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Oct.
3, 1998, at C4. This has become commonly known as the "Mike Tyson loophole" in which a
fighter who has had his license revoked for nonmedical reasons can nonetheless apply for a
license in another state without receiving the revoking state's permission. Id. at C4. The
Muhamad Ali Boxing Reform Act proposed in 1998 would have closed this loophole. See S.
2238, 105th Cong. § 5 (1998).
15 2 See Timothy W. Smith, Lack of Closure After Tyson Hearing Frustrates New Jersey's
Commissioner, N.Y. TI'ES, Aug. 15, 1998, at C7.
15 3 See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
15 4 The Act does provide for a feasibility study for a pension plan, but no action has been
taken on funding a plan. See 15 U.S.C. § 631 1(a) (Supp. 1I 1997).
155 See Lane, supra note 13, at 204.
156 See Robert A. McCormick, Baseball's Third Strike: The Triumph of Collective
Bargaining in Professional Baseball, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1152 (1982) (discussing the
owner-player compromise on league pension structure); Laurence B. Wohl, Fiduciary Duties
Under ERISA: A Tale of Multiple Loyalties, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 43, 84 n.172 (1994)
(discussing the National Football League's player pension program).
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structure.
Finally, the Act makes no effort to regulate the "alphabet soup"15 7
sanctioning bodies that govern the sport. Because of this, sanctioning agencies
such as the WBC, WBA, and IBF continue to have free reign to rank fighters as
they see fit-giving fighters under contract with promoters allied to a sanctioning
body opportunities at title fights and lucrative paydays, W;hile boxers who refuse
to contract with an allied promoter are relegated to less lucrative fights. This
unregulated system perpetuates the lack of financial security a fighter has during
his career because he must always be mindful to associate with the "right"
promoter.158
Thus, while the Act establishes nationwide minimum standards of safety, it
still fails to provide for a professional fighter's financial security or to give a
fighter an equitable bargaining position within the sport. Because of these
weaknesses, it is not surprising that one of the senators, John McCain, who
initially started the movement toward federal boxing reform, stated that he felt the
Act did not go far enough in protecting the interests of fighters. 159 Indeed, in
1998, McCain introduced the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act 160 to attempt
to establish further financial safeguards for professional boxers. However, like
every boxing statute except the Professional Boxing Safety Act, the bill died in
Congress.
IV. UNIONIzATION UNDER THE NATIONAL LABoR RELATIONS ACT: AN
ALTERNATIVE TO FURTHER FEDERAL REGULATION
In response to a question about the possibility of the federal government
regulating boxing, Don King said, "If they are going to regulate boxing they
157 See 138 CONG. REC. S5658, S5663 (1992) (report presented by Sen. Roth referring to
the variety ofboxing sanctioning bodies known largely by their initials).158 See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
159 See Howard, supra note 9, at 114.
160 The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, S. 2238, 105th Cong. (1998). Indeed, partly
as a result of a controversial decision in a March 1999 heavyweight championship fight
between Evander Holyfield and Lennox Lewis, McCain introduced the 1999 version of the
Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act. See S. 305 106th Cong. (1999). This newest proposed
legislation goes farther in protecting a fighter than the statute currently in effect. For example,
the bill establishes a one-year limit on promotional contracts, see id. § 15(a)(2)(1), restricts
conflicts of interest between promoters and managers, id. § 15(b), and mandates the public
disclosure of a sanctioning organization's ratings criteria, id. § 16(d). However, while the
Senate version of the legislation passed, the House version, H.R. 1832, 106th Cong. (1999),
was still pending before the Commerce Committee as of September 24, 1999. In light of the
history of attempts at similar legislation, it remains to be seen whether this most recent attempt
to regulate the industry will have any success.
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should have to regulate football, baseball, hockey and basketball." 161 This sums
up the primary argument proffered by opponents of boxing regulation: no other
American sport is regulated at the federal level, so boxing should not be treated
differently. 162 Conversely, supporters of federal regulation, such as Senator John
McCain and Congressman Bill Richardson, argue that current regulation is
insufficient considering the nature of the sport.163 The structure of boxing-with
no uniform governing body-is so different from other major sports that it is
necessary to regulate it in order to protect individual fighters' interests.164
However, both parties neglect another major difference between boxing and other
major American professional sports: boxing does not have a union that is
empowered under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to bargain on behalf
of its members. 165
Indeed, before unionization, team sports such as professional baseball had
problems similar to those of professional boxing.166 Players had no pension nor
retirement plans, 167 were restricted in their professional movement from one team
to another,168 and faced less than ideal working conditions while being financially
exploited by owners. Like workers in other industries, unionization of
161 See Brubaker, supra note 129, at C3 (expressing the view that regulating professional
boxing without regulating other sports is inequitable).
162 See Hearings on Boxing Rules Revision, supra note 12 (statement of Walter Stone,
counsel for the IBF) (arguing that no other sport is regulated at the federal level, and that
professional boxing is making efforts to improve financial conditions for fighters).
163 See Howard, supra note 9, at 114; see also supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text
(noting that in 1998 McCain attempted unsuccessfully to pass the Muhammad Ali Boxing
Reform Act that would have placed additional federal regulations on the sport).
164 See Brubaker, supra note 129, at C3. Congressman Richardson states, "boxing differs
from the other professional sports in that you'll never find a situation where one team owner
could overrule the commissioner of football. In boxing, a promoter with a financial interest tells
the governing bodies of the sport what to do." Id.
165 It is possible for a union to exist that does not meet the requirements (and does not gain
the protection) of the NLRA. However, given the nature of relations between boxers, managers,
and promoters within the sport, the only way professional boxers could be assured equitable
bargaining power is through federal labor law protection.
166 See, e.g., HELYAR, supra note 25, at 18-38 (detailing the history of scandal, lack of
pensions, and low pay before the unionization of Major League Baseball); JAMES EDWARD
MILLER, supra note 24, at 12-14.
167 See HELYAR, supra note 25, at 16-38 (detailing the lack of benefits Major League
Baseball players received before instituting a full-time union); JAMES EDWARD MILLER, supra
note 24, at 13 (stating that the first pension plan was enacted in the 1940s because of owners'
fears of baseball unionization).
168 See Hobel, supra note 27, at 164-69 (detailing the evolution of free agency and the
role of sports labor unions); see also Peter N. Katz, A History of Free Agency in the United
States and Great Britain: Who's Leading the Charge?, 15 COMP. LAB. L.J. 371,375-80 (1994)
(describing restrictions on baseball players' movement between teams).
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professional athletes in team sports dramatically improved working conditions
and financial stability.169
However, the NLRB has never considered whether a professional boxers'
union would fall within the jurisdiction of the NLRA. 170 Indeed, it is unclear
whether the Board would even define professional boxers as employees under the
NLRA-a requirement to unionize under the statute. This Part will argue that a
proper application of the NLRB's employment-status test would define
professional boxers as employees, thus enabling them to collectively bargain with
boxing promoters and other management in an attempt to secure a universal
standard of physical and financial security during and after their careers without
further federal statutory intervention.
Section A of this Part will provide a brief overview of the NLRA, as well as
the statute's primary requirements for unionization. Section B will detail the case
law and statutory history surrounding the employment-status test of the NLRA,
concluding with the factors the NLRB currently applies in determining whether
an individual falls under the NLRA's ambit. Section C will then apply these
factors, along with analogous case law, arguing that professional boxers should be
considered employees under the statute.
A. The National Labor Relations Act and its Requirements for
Unionization
The modem-day NLRA was the result of the evolution of several fair labor
statutes passed during the New Deal era ofthe late 1920s and early 1930s. 171 First
passed in 1935, the NLRA grants "employees" statutory rights against
management in their given industries. Chief among these are the rights to
organize unions172 that serve as the exclusive representatives 173 for labor interests
in their field, to bargain collectively with management on issues related to the
workplace, and to strike and picket peacefully when bargaining is ineffective.1 74
The NLRA also authorizes the NLRB as the chief decisionmaking and
prosecutory body in conflicts that arise under the statute.175
169 See, e.g., McCormick, supra note 156; MARVIN MILLER, supra note 24 (detailing the
strides baseball players made after unionization).
170 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994).
171 These statutes included the Railway Labor Act of 1926, designed to peacefully settle
disputes between railway workers and management, and the Norris-LaGuardia and Wagner
Acts, which served as the precursor to the modem NLRA. See generally MELVIN DUBOFsKY,
THE STATE AND LABOR IN MODERN AMERICA (1994).
172 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
173 See id. § 159(a).
174 See id. § 157.
175 See id. § 153. Prior to the establishment of the NLRA, the Board decided cases arising
under the Wagner Act. See generally DUBOFSKY, supra note 171.
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However, several occupational groups fall outside of the NLRA's jurisdiction
and thus receive no federal protection for their union activities. First, the statute
applies to only employees of industries affecting commerce.176 Theoretically, this
would seem to include all industries if one applies the Supreme Court's
Commerce Clause test1 77 However, as a practical matter, the NLRB has refused
to provide jurisdiction (and therefore the protection of the NLRA) over industries
that do not have a "substantial" effect on interstate commerce.178 In defining this
standard, the NLRB has established minimum dollar limits for most industries
that an employer must exceed in order to meet the substantial effect
requirement.179
The NLRB has not established a pre-set limit for industries within
professional sports,180 preferring to judge these on a case-by-case basis. However,
it has found that most of the professional sports organizations, including relatively
smaller revenue sports, have met the substantial effect standard.181 In Major
176 See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1994).
177 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. I & 3; Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28
(1942) (allowing Congress to regulate the production of wheat grown and consumed entirely on
one farm under the Commerce Clause because changes in the amount of wheat grown at that
farm may affect the interstate import of wheat). Indeed, for several years the Court took an
expansive view of what applied under the Commerce Clause. However, in US. v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995), the Court held that possession of guns in a public school did not
affect interstate commerce and was beyond congressional authority to regulate under the
Commerce Clause. This was the first time in more than fifty years that the Court had struck
down a federal law for not meeting the Commerce Clause requirement For additional analysis
on the Commerce Clause and its changing role under the Court, see, e.g., Lee G. Grabel, United
States v. Lopez and the Constitutionality of the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992: Dancing
Precariously on the Head of the Commerce Clause Pin, 28 RUTGERS LU. 491, 493-507
(analyzing "[w]hether Lopez has gutted the Commerce Clause, leaving it a limp and frail
creature of the shadows!); Peter A. Lauricella, The Real "Contract with America". The
Original Intent of the Tenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1377,
1380-82 (1997) (arguing that the Court should continue to follow Lopez in applying the
"original intent?' of the Commerce Clause and return to the states their traditional governing
powers).
178 See Major League Rodeo, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 743, 744 (1979) (noting that the NLRB
has established minimum profit standards that a business must reach before the NLRB will
exercise jurisdiction).
179 See, e.g., Tatm Realty Corp., 322 NL.R.B. 863, 863 (1997) (adopting a $500,000
jurisdictional standard over retail businesses); United Way of Howard County, 287 N.LR.B.
987, 987-88 (1988) (adopting a $250,000 jurisdictional standard for social service
organizations); Rebecca Blaylock Nursery Sch., Inc., 260 N.L.R.B. 1428, 1428 (1982)
(reaffirming a $250,000 jurisdictional standard for day-care centers).
180 See Major League Rodeo, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. at 744 n.7 ("The Board, in its assertion
of jurisdiction over professional sports employers, has not previously established a specific
discretionary jurisdictional standard, and we decline to do so herein?).
181 See Volusia Jai Alai, Inc., 221 N.L.B. 1280, 1282 (1975) (asserting jurisdiction over
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League Rodeo, Inc.,182 for example, the NLRB ruled that a rodeo league that
traveled between six states and received in excess of $281,000 met the substantial
effect on commerce requirement. 183
While the NLRB has never explicitly ruled on whether professional boxing
substantially affects interstate commerce, the financial revenue of the boxing
industry seems to make it extremely likely that the sport would meet the standard.
Boxing is a billion dollar industry with fans typically spending $500 million
dollars a year nationwide on tickets and pay-per-view television broadcast fees
alone.184 Thus, considering the NLRB's exercise of jurisdiction in smaller-
revenue sports, such as in Major League Rodeo, it is a near-certainty that
professional boxing would meet the NLRB's commerce test
B. Agency Principles and a Professional Boxer's Employee Status
However, even if professional boxing meets the commerce standard, boxers
may only unionize under the NLRA if they are considered employees under the
statute.185 In order to determine who is defined as an employee under the law, one
must look to both statutory and case law history that have attempted to distinguish
employees under the NLRA.
Early NLRB cases, supported by the Supreme Court, relied on an economic
realities test in determining whether an individual was an employee for purposes
of the NLRA. In NLRB v. Hearst,186 for example, the Supreme Court upheld the
ajai alai fronton (arena)); American League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B. 190, 190
(1969) (asserting jurisdiction over Major League Baseball). But see Yonkers Raceway, Inc.,
196 N.L.R.B. 373, 373 (1972) (declining to assert jurisdiction over local horse racing track).
182 246 N.L.R.B. 743 (1979).
183 See id at 744.
184 See Lane, supra note 13, at 204.
185 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994) (covering the scope of who may organize, as well as what
actions they may take as a labor organization, by stating, "[e]mployees shall have the right to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining... "). Thus, the statute clearly mandates that in order to have
the right to bargain collectively, an individual must be an employee. Early court cases rejected
common law tests of employee status and instead applied an economic realities test to
determine whether an individual was considered an employee for statutory purposes. See
NLRB v. Hearst, 322 U.S. 111, 124, 131-32 (1944) (holding that Congress did not intend to
apply variations of a common law definition of employee, and upholding the NLRB's
examination of the economic relationship between an employer and the individual in
determining that a group of newspaper workers were employees under the NLRA). Responding
to the Hearst decision, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Amendment to the NLRA,
specifically excluding individuals considered independent contractors. See infra note 189 and
accompanying text.
186 322 U.S. 111, 131-32 (1944) (overruled by NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390
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NLRB's application of an economic realities test in determining that a group of
newspaper vendors 187 were employees as defined by the NLRA. According to the
Court, the fact that the publisher controlled where the vendors could work, as well
as the supply and prices of p~pers, was enough for the NLRB to reasonably
conclude that the vendors were the publisher's employees under the NLRA. 188
However, in response to Hearst, Congress amended section 2 of the
NLRA18 9 to restrict the Supreme Court-supported economic realities test of
employee status. While section 2 broadly defines the term "employee,"' 190 it also
lists classes of individuals who are excluded as employees under the NLRA.
Among these,191 the section states that an employee "shall not include any
individual... having the status of an independent contractor ... ,,192 While the
NLRA does not specifically define the term "independent contractor," Congress
U.S. 254,256 (1968)).
187 See Hearst, 322 U.S. at 116-18. The newspaper vendors were "newsboys"-generally
mature men who sold papers in high-traffic areas of Los Angeles and the surrounding area. The
newsboys received newspapers from the company's district manager, distributed some to other
vendors located in lower traffic areas, and sold the rest to passersby. The company's district
manager controlled what hours the newsboys worked as well as where they were stationed. In
retum, the newsboys kept the profits they made from selling the newspapers.188 See id. at 131-32. For a further analysis of Hearst, see, e.g., Ruth Burdick, Principles
of Agency Permit the NLRB to Consider Additional Factors ofEntrepreneurial Independence
and the Relative Dependence of Employees When Determining Independent Contractor Status
Under Section 2(3), 15 HOFSTRALAB. L.J 75, 106-08 (1997) (detailing the factors of economic
dependency in the Hearst case and applying them to the economic realities test).
189 These amendments were known collectively as the Taft-Hartley Act. For a detailed
history of Taft-Hartley, see generally Steven E. Abraham, The Impact of the Taft-Hartley Act
on the Balance of Power in Industrial Relations, 33 AM. Bus. L.J. 341 (1996) (discussing the
history of Taft-Hartley); Nelson Lichtenstein, Taft-Hartley: A Slave Labor Law?, 47 CATm. U.
L. REV. 763 (1998) (discussing the socioeconomic impact and origins of Taft-Hartley).
190 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994) Section 2 states that:
The term 'employee'... shall not be limited to the employees of a particular -
employer.., and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of;
or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and
who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment....
Id.
191 See id. In addition to independent contractors, the section excludes "agricultural
laborers," domestic servants of any "family or person at his home," anyone employed by his
parent or spouse, any supervisor, or anyone working for an employer covered by the Railway
Labor Act. Id. Because professional boxers clearly do not fall under any of these categories,
these classes are not analyzed in this Note.19 2 Id. The NLRA also excludes certain classes of employers from its requirements under
29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1994)-in effect excluding the employees of these employers. Among the
employers excluded are federal, state, and municipal entities. Because boxing promoters and
managers are not among the excluded employers, section 152(2) is not analyzed here.
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made clear that the term was placed within the NLRA to overrule the economic
factors test applied in Hearst. The House Committee Report first noted that "[ljn
the case of NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., the Board expanded the definition
of the term "employee" beyond anything that it ever had included before, and the
Supreme Court upheld the Board."'193 The Supreme Court reasoned that:
there always has been a difference, and a big difference, between "employees"
and "independent contractors." "Employees" work for wages or salaries under
direct supervision. "Independent contractors" undertake to do a job for a price,
decide how the work will be done, usually hire others to do the work, and depend
for their income not upon wages, but... upon profits.... To correct what the
Board has done... the bill excludes "independent contractors" from the
definition of"employee". [sic] 194
Thus, in applying this new standard, the Supreme Court overturned its prior
decision in Hearst when it held that the NLRB eschew the economic realities test
in favor of a broad application of agency principles when determining employee
status in NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America.195 However, despite the Court's
endorsement of applying the broad range of agency principles, it refused to
prioritize them. Instead, it directed both the NLRB and reviewing courts to use
and weigh factors depending on the circumstances of each case. According to the
Court, "there is no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find
the answer, but all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and
weighed with no one factor being decisive."' 96
Since United Insurance, courts and the NLRB have continued to refuse to
identify a specific formula to define an independent contractor.197 Reviewing
courts have relied on a variety of case-specific factors,198 most of which are
derived from the determination used in the Restatement (Second) of Agency.199
193 H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 18 (1947).
194 Id.
195 390 U.S. 254 (1968).
196 Id. at 258.
197 See, e.g., Herald Co. v. NLRB, 444 F2d 430,433 (2d Cir. 1971) (concluding that no
single agency principle is determinative in defining employee status); NLRB v. Warner, 587
F.2d 896, 899 (8th Cir. 1978) (assessing agency factors on a case-by-case basis in making the
distinction between employees and independent contractors).198 See Lorenz Schneider Co. v. NLRB, 517 F.2d 445,446 (2d Cir. 1975) (determining an
individual's relationship to his employer requires "case-by-case determinations whether the
relationship between a business enterprise and other persons is that of employer and employee"
or is that of an independent contractor).
199 See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958). For decisions that have
explicitly approved of the use of the factors enumerated in the Restatement (Second), see e.g.
NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1995) (applying principles of the
Restatement (Second) in determining whether paid union organizers were employees of
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According to section 220(2), in determining whether a worker is an independent
contractor, the fact finder must examine:
(a) the extent of the control which, by the agreement the master may
exercise over the details of the work; (b) whether or not the one employed is
engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation, with
reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction
of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d) the skill required in the
particular occupation; (e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; (f)
the length of time for which the person is employed, (g) the method of payment
whether by the time or by the job; (h) whether or not the work is part of the
regular business of the employer, (i) whether or not the parties believe they are
creating the relation of master and servant; and (j) whether the principal is or is
not in business. 200
Yet, in keeping with the malleable standard enunciated by United Insurance,
courts will apply only the factors relevant to the given case, including additional
factors not listed by the Restatement (Second) of Agency, if necessary. Thus, in
determining whether boxers should be considered employees under the NLRA,
one must focus upon the unique nature of the boxer's relationship with his
promoter.
Because professional boxing is a sport in which the boxer contracts
individually with the manager and the promoter and exerts a measure of control
over his day to day training, cases involving the unionization of team sports
would not necessarily apply.201 However, while sports involving individual
athletes may be more analogous, the NLRB has not considered the employee
status of an athlete in any individual sport. For example, while the NLRB has
considered the ability ofjai alai202 players to unionize, its analysis has focused on
the commerce test and its jurisdiction over state-regulated industries rather than
petitioner); Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42 v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 1322, 1328-29 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (applying factors of agency relationship in the Restatement (Second) in holding that
supervised truckers were employees under the NLRA).
200 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958).
201 Indeed, neither the NLRB nor reviewing courts have fully considered the specific issue
of whether athletes on sports teams are independent contractors. The question arose but was
dismissed in Major League Rodeo, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 743, 744 n.4 (1979) ("ITihe Employer
argued that the Board lacks jurisdiction over it because its employees were... independent
contractors. The Employer has not raised these contentions in its brief to us. In any event, the
record is devoid of evidence supporting such contentions, and we find them without merit.").
202 Jai alai is a sport similar to handball. Players catch and throw a ball within a three-
walled court using a curved basket called a cesta. See Volusia Jai Alai, 221 N.L.RB. 1280,
1280 (1975). The players sign short-term work contracts for the jai alai season at each fronton,
then move to the next fronton. See id. at 1281 n.2.
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on the employment-status test 203 However, because of the unique status of
fighters relative to promoters, the NLRB is more likely to apply the employment-
status test when determining whether boxers may unionize.20 4
Thus, in order to determine a boxer's employment status under the NLRA, it
is first necessary to look to the agency factors relevant to the boxer's working
conditions205 and then to analyze how these factors were applied to labor cases
outside of professional athletics that involved employment relationships similar to
that of the boxer and the promoter.
In determining an employee's status under the NLRA, although none of the
agency factors are dispositive in every case, courts often give primary weight to
the "right to control" test--the extent to which the employer may exercise control
over the agent's work.206 As noted previously, promoters, through their exclusive
2 03 See id at 1282 (holding that the NLRB can take jurisdiction over an otherwise state-
regulated industry because the state only regulates the pari-mutuel aspect of the industry);
Grand Resorts, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 539, 539-40 (1975) (holding that jai alai met the NLRB's
commerce jurisdictional requirement based in part on the fact that the resort used the players in
its promotional advertisements that brought tourists from out of state).
For an analysis of agency principles arguing in favor of professional wrestlers being
considered employees under the NLRA, see Stephen S. Zashin, Bodyslamfrom the Top Rope:
Unequal Bargaining Power and Professional Wrestling's Failure to Unionize, 12 U. MIAMI
ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 1, 24-54 (1994-95) (arguing primarily that because professional
wrestling is "fixed" with wrestling syndicate promoters scripting the matches, the promoters
qualify as employers under the NLRA).
204 In Volusia Jai Alai, the Court detailed the fact that fronton associates paid for player
training, moving expenses, etc. See Volusia Jai Alai, 221 N.L.R.B. at 1280. The frontons thus
had total control over the training, the hiring and firing of coaches, etc. Additionally, jai alai
players participate in matches nightly during the season. See id. Although jai alai players
participate in an individual sport per se, there is more day to day employer control over the
athletes than in a sport such as boxing. Indeed, the popular media have portrayed boxers as
independent contractors. See Lane, supra note 13, at 206 (describing boxers as independent
contractors).
205 See Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 506 F.2d 596, 597 (1st Cir. 1974) (noting courts
must first look to relevant agency factors).
20 6 See C.C. Eastern, Inc. v. NLRB, 60 F3d 855, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting the
NLRB's determination that "an employer-employee relationship exists when the employer
reserves not only the right to control the result achieved, but also the means to be used in
attaining the resul'); Seven-Up, 506 F.2d. at 597 ("The right to control the manner of physical
performance of the services-as opposed to control over the results sought-is generally
determinative of employee status, although a number of matters of fact must be considered in
making that determination."). Indeed, the Supreme Court gave the "right to control" test an
arguably more liberal interpretation three years ago by ruling that union-paid agents who took
jobs with an employer solely for the purpose of organizing a union at that employer's
workplace are still considered employees of the workplace, because the employer had a right to
control their day to day work activities. See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. 85, 94-
95 (1995); see also Gregory C. Kloeppel, Salt Anyone? The United States Supreme Court
Holds That Paid Union Organizers Qualify as Employees Under the NLRA in NLRB v. Town
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representation contract, have the power to determine each of a boxer's opponents.
In addition, the promoter, with input from a fighter, has the right to negotiate the
time and place of the bout.20 7 Thus, while the promoter may not exercise control
over the day to day training of the fighter, who names his own trainers and
comermen,20 8 the promoter nonetheless controls the most vital economic
elements of the fighter's career.209
Indeed, reviewing courts have given great weight to the overall control an
employer may exert in determining employee status. For example, the First
Circuit held that soda distributors who were tied to exclusive contracts with the
Seven-Up Bottling Company and whose sales territory was controlled by the
company were employees, despite the fact that the distributors hired and paid
assistants to make deliveries and set their own daily schedules.210 According to
the court, the independence the distributors had in their day to day operations was
outweighed by the overall control the company exerted2 11
In another distribution case,212 the Sixth Circuit agreed with the weight the
& Country Electric, Inc., 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 243, 258-65 (1998) (analyzing the Court's
expansion of the statutory definition of employee).
207 See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
208 See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 31, at 253-60 (detailing Mike Tyson's firing of Kevin
Rooney as his trainer and hiring of Aaron Snoweel, a childhood friend of his); HAUSER, supra
note 31, at 77,-101 (detailing boxer Billy Costello's selection of comermen, and trainers along
with input from his manager).
209 See supra notes 42-62 and accompanying text (detailing the authority of a promoter to
select opponents, set fight dates, and negotiate fight purses with broadcast agencies and site
organizers).
2 10 See Seven-Up, 506 F.2d at 600, in which the court wrote:
The record amply supports the Board's conclusion that the company has the right to,
and does, control the distributors' performance of their duties-not by any formal
authority, but by means of suggestions which are adhered to because of the company's
power to grant and revoke distributorships and to alter their value at will.
Indeed, this is akin to a promoter's power over a professional boxer. A promoter can control a
fighter's career, as well as how much money he may make over the minimum purse-per-bout
clause by selecting the competitors the fighter will face.
211 See id at 600 (holding that the NLRB's weighing of the appropriate agency factors
was reasonable under the circumstances).
212 See NLRB v. Brush-Moore Newspapers, Inc., 413 F.2d 809 (6th Cir. 1969). The
NLRB, as well as reviewing courts, has been relatively liberal in granting employee status to
distributors and drivers, in which the employers have less "hands-on" supervisory control of
day to day operations. Conversely, the NLRB has been relatively strict in its application of the
right of control test with regard to entertainers, where supervisors take more of an active role in
the oversight of the work. Compare St. Charles Journal, Inc. v. NLRB, 679 F.2d 759, 761 (8th
Cir. 1982) (upholding an NLRB decision that newspaper distributors were employees of a
publisher despite their overall freedom on their day to day route), and Seven-Up, 506 F.2d at
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NLRB gave to the existence of the exclusive contract the distributor was required
to sign, the publisher's control of sales territory, and the indefinite length-of-
service clauses in determining that a group of newspaper distributors were
employees of their publisher. According to the court, these three characteristics
evidenced a right of control over the distributors that plausibly outweighed the
distributors' entrepreneurial interest in the resale of the newspapers.213
As in these cases, promoters, while lacking day to day control over a
professional fighter, nonetheless limit his ability to fight through the use of the
exclusive representation contract Indeed, a promoter, through the use of this
power, can force a champion whom he represents to relinquish his title belt by
refusing to promote a fight against a mandatory challenger. 214 Thus, the overall
control that a promoter exerts over a fighter's career is at least as extensive as that
in both Seven-Up and Brush-Moore.
An additional factor that lends support for a fighter's status as an employee
under the NLRA is his role within the fight promotion itself. As explained in
United Insurance,2 15 one of the factors that led the Supreme Court to rule that the
insurance company's debit agents at issue were employees was the fact that the
agents "do not operate their own independent businesses, but perform functions
600, and Brush-Moore, 413 F.2d 809, with Comedy Store, 265 N.L.R.B. 1422, 1449-50 (1982)
(holding comedians are independent contractors because of their short-term, nonguaranteed
work at a nightclub), and American Broadcast Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 13, 18 (1957) (finding that
musical composers were independent contractors because the Company hired the composers on
short-term contracts, and, while the company supervised the end result, it did not control the
manner in which the result was accomplished). But see Nevada Resort Ass'n, 250 N.L.R.B.
626, 626 (1980) (holding that a hotel's lounge musicians were employees of the hotel, despite
the fact that they did not have the same constraints as members of the hotel's orchestra). It is
arguable that because of the long-term, exclusive relationship of boxing contracts, boxers are
more akin to distributors than entertainers under short-term contract that the NLRB has
considered.
213 See Brush-Moore, 413 F.2d at 814-15 (holding the exclusive nature of the contract to
outweigh the fact that a provision in the contract deemed the workers as independent
contractors); see also Seven-Up, 506 F.2d at 600 ("It is significant that none of the
distributors-whatever their theoretical freedom to deliver non-competing products--perform
delivery services for anyone but the company."). Additionally, the court in Brush-Moore
considered the fact that the distributors had a small risk of loss so long as the employer provided
the papers. See Brush-Moore, 413 F.2d at 815 ("The risk of loss is another factor to be
considered in determining whether the status is that of employer-employee or that of an
independent contractor. Here, the newsstand operators' risk of loss is minimized."). This is
analogous to the working conditions of professional boxers, where the boxer's risk of loss is
minimized due to the minimum purse-per-bout clause, while the promoter may actually lose
money, especially early in a fighter's career. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text
2 15 See supra notes 195-204 and accompanying text (explaining United Insurance
and the Court's application of agency standards, including the employee's relationship to
the central function of the business).
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that are an essential part of the company's normal operations .... "216 Similar to
United Insurance, professional fighters are an "essential part' of a promoter's
operations. Indeed, it is impossible to promote a fight without the fighters
themselves.
Conversely, certain factors lead one to view professional fighters as
independent contractors. Perhaps the primary element that, on its face, argues a
boxer's status as an independent contractor is the promotional contract itself
Promotional contracts explicitly stipulate that the fighter is deemed an
independent contractor and withhold no employee benefits 17 Additionally, as
noted above, the fighter exerts fairly wide control over his choice of trainer, and
thus, his day to day training regimen.l2 However, case law suggests that these
factors, when weighed against the broader control a promoter exerts over a
fighter, would not be enough to establish the fighter as an independent contractor.
Indeed, in Herald Co. v. NLRB219 the Second Circuit upheld an NLRB
determination that newspaper distributors were employees, despite contracts that
classified the distributors as independent contractors. 2 0 According to the court
the fact that the distributors were part of an essential function of the publication,
combined with the overall control the company exerted over its distributors'
income (through contractual minimums and delivery limits), outweighed the form
designation.221
Finally, after applying the most relevant agency relationship factors, it is
illuminative to re-examine the House Report, which provides the only working
definition the legislature proffered regarding the employment status test.
According to the House Report of Taft-Hartley, "'[e]mployees' work for wages
or salaries under direct supervision. 'Independent contractors' . . .depend for their
income not upon wages, but... upon profits.1222 Most boxers, because of their
contractual minimum purse-per-bout guarantees, depend primarily on wages,
while promoters, whose income is dependent on the success of the fight they have
arranged, take the profits or losses of the arrangement. Thus, when taken in
216Id. at 259.
2 17 See Hearings on Boxing Rules Revision, supra note 12 (statement of Sen. John
McCain) (stating that federal regulation is necessary for boxers because of their
independent contractor status and referring to the explicit language in most boxing
promotional contracts).
218 See supra Part LY.B.
219 444 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1971).
220 See id. at 435; see also Brush-Moore, 413 F.2d at 814-15 (finding that the term
"independent contractor" on the employment contract has little weight in light of the
employer's overall right to control).
221 See Herald Co., 444 F.2d at 435.
2 22 H.1R REP. No. 80-245, at 18 (1947).
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combination with all of the relevant agency factors, it seems clear that
professional boxers meet the NLRB's employment status test under the NLRA.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite various federal attempts over the last four decades to regulate
prizefighting, the average boxer continues to be subject to long-term inequitable
contracts that provide no financial security for his life outside the ring. Boxers are
also subject to control at the hands of promoters who can send the fighter into a
jurisdiction that inadequately protects him in the ring.
However, a boxing union would help to alter the balance of power within the
sport. Individual professional boxers, who may have their careers stymied by
promoters and allied sanctioning bodies should they demand safer working
conditions, would instead be part of a group that could place a halt to the sport-
and the promoters' and sanctioning agencies' income-by federally protected
work stoppages until better working conditions were established.
As a practical matter, the NLRB would likely certify the class of licensed
promoters as the management with whom the boxing union would negotiate.
Thus, the largest potential direct effects of a boxing union would be on the
average fighter's contract: shorter contract lengths, option clauses that provide the
fighter more equitable bargaining power, terms that allow a fighter more of a
choice in opponent selection, and pension plan arrangements. Moreover, the
promoter's role in arranging fights, including venue selection and facilities
preparations, also allows safety issues to be addressed in union negotiations,
giving fighters-the individuals who are directly at risk of injury-a voice in
establishing safety standards they consider acceptable.
While continued federal regulation may one day fully protect the interest of
professional boxers, history suggests this process will be slow and controversial.
Additionally, regulation at the federal level fails to provide boxers a voice in the
operation of their own sport; instead leaving decisions on safety and financial
issues up to individuals that may not "know a left hook from a fish hook.'2 23 The
alternative-a proper application of the employment status test by the NLRB,
followed by the establishment of a professional boxing union-would provide
boxers a role in the governance of their sport as well as aid in protecting their
physical and financial interests. In other words, a favorable NLRB opinion would
provide boxers the opportunity to fight for greater rights within their sport.
2 2 3 See Deitch supra note 117, at 3.
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